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on the otlher hand, lhave yet to conflont the problem.4 In any case, an appropriate theoretical apparatus, one that involves a detailed analysis of concrete aspects of the peasanitry's social structure, is necessary in order to reach a satisfactory answer.
Roy Hofheinz and Eugen Weber have made provocative attempts to locate sources of the rural strength of radical political movements by mneans of highly suggestive correlation analyses.5 Altlhouglh Hofheinz deals with the Chinese Communists and Weber with the Rumanian Iron Guard, both scholars employ essentially the sanme technique: after determining where the radical movement was strongest, they search for social conditions more or less peculiar to the area of the nmovement's strength oin the assumption that peculiarity implies some degree of causality. The present analysis is theoretically and technically similar to Hofheinz's and Weber's analyses, but its focus is on one very specific and statistically quantifiable factor-landholdings. Do landlessness or the size of a peasant's landholdiing play some role in determining the peasant's political predilections? That this is so is pretty much taken as an axiom of current social science research on this question. Jeffrey Paige has pointed out that a peasant's relationship to the land he works is very closely related to the form his political activity will take.6
Naturally, no one factol-can ever suffice to explain a social phenomenon, and landholdings alone obviously do not "explain" Ukrainian Communist and Ukrainian Nationalist influence in WolylAz wojewo6dstwo. The size of the working class, the extent of urbanization, a region's geopolitical significance, as well as such cultural factors as religion, education, and ideology are also of great significance. However, insofar as the problem being examined is the radical movements' relationship to the peasantry, land-that which makes the peasant uniquely a peasant-assumes particular importance.
It is often assumed that a movement of the radical left, such as the KPZU, draws its support from the lowest classes and strata of a given population, and of the Communists and consolidated the influence of Ukrainian nationalism among the broadest Ukrainian masses" (see Mirchuk, Narys istorii Orhauiza tsii Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, p. 454). Vasiuta is typical of the opposite tendency: "The great ideas of Marxism-Leninism lighted the pathl of the revolutionary movement in Western Ukraine. Under the leadership of the KPZU this movement developed on the principles of class solidarity and proletarian internationialisnm. On the basis of the experience of the CPSU and its component part, the CP Ukraine, the Communists of Western Ukraine mastered the legal and illegal forms of struggle anid spread their influence over the toiling masses of the village" (see Vasiuta, Selians'kyi rukh, .
4. John Armstrong, the only non-Ukrainian Western scholar to have studied Ukrainian nationalism, deals only with the political and ideological aspects of the movement (see Armstrong, Ukrain-ian. Nationialism1).
5. Roy Hofheinz, "The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns, 1923 -1943 ., Chinese Comimunist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 3-77; Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., International Fascism 1920 -1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966 6. Jeffrey Paige, Agrarian Revoluttion: Social Movemlentts and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World (New York: The Free Press, 1975) . Some of the more recent literature dealing with this theme inicludes Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics a.lnd Revolution (Princeton, 1975 ) Comparative Politics, 8, no. 3 (April 1976 ) (special issue on "Peasants and Revolution") James C. Scott, "Exploitation in Rural Class Relations: A Victim's Perspective, " Comparative Politics, 7, no. 4 (July 1975) . that a movement of the radical right, such as the OUN, finds its supporters among the middle or lower middle classes. One might therefore expect the landless agricultural laborers and poor peasants (defined as owning 0-5 hectares of land) to support the Communists, and the middle (5-10 hectares) and rich (10-50 hectares) peasantry to support the Nationalists. This study, however, will show that the reality of radical agrarian politics in Wolyn wojewodztwo in the 1930s was far more complex.
Although agricultural laborers were indeed the backbone of the KPZU in the countryside, poor peasants rallied not to the Communists, but to the Nationalists. On the other hand, neither the rich nor the middle peasantry apparently saw the OUN as representing their interests. In short, the rural poor, as represented by two very different strata, served as the base for both revolutionary movements. An explanation of why the peasantry aligned itself in this manner will be offered after the eminpirical data are presented.
Wolynf, along with Lwow, Tarnopol, and Stanistawow, was one of four wojewodztwa in interwar Poland where Ukrainians comprised the majority of the population. Located in the southeastern corner of the newly founded state, Wotyni wojewodztwo consisted of nine-eleven administrative districts known as powiaty between 1921 and 1939. The 1921 census lists Dubno, Horochow, Kowel, Krzemieniec, Luboml, Luck, Rowne, Wlodzimierz, and Ostrog (named after their administrative centers). By the 1930s, the boundaries of most of these pozwiaty had been changed, sometimes radically: the powiat of Ostrog Was renamed Zdotbunow, that of Rowne was divided into Rowne and Kostopol powuiaty, and an eleventh poz *at, Sarny, was detached from Polesie wojewodztwo in the north and added to Wolyn.
Wolynf wojewodztwo was one of Poland's most underdeveloped regions. Large areas were covered with dense forests and much of the available agricultural land was of poor quality. Industry was virtually nonexistent and basic commodity consumption was much lower than in other wojewodztwa. The majority of the Greek Orthodox Ukrainian population was illiterate and lacking in national self-awareness.
Wolyin's total population at the time of the 1931 census was 2,085,574. Ukrainians comprised about 68 percent of this number, Poles 17 percent, and Jews 8 percent. The remainder was divided among Russians, Belorussians, Czechs, Lithuanians, and Germans.7 About 95 percent of all Ukrainians in Wolyn lived in villages. Those inhabiting the cities were a small minority compared to the numerically dominant urban ethnic groups-the Poles and Jews. It is not surprising that most Ukrainians were involved in some form of agriculture. As the censuses of 1921 and 1931 reveal, 93 percent of all Ukrainians worked in agriculture, and only 3 percent in mining and industry. The remaining 4 percent were fairly equally divided among commerce, communications and transport, public service, domestic service, and officially registered unemployment.8 With regard to rural Ukrainians alone, 96 percent were occupied in agriculture, with only 2 percent in mining and industry.9 The Ukrainian working 7. Drugi powszechny spis ludnos'ci 2 dn. 9.XII 1931 r., Wojezzuidztwo Wo1ynskie (Warsaw, 1938) class, meanwhile, althoughl not an insubstantial number (some eleven to twelve thousand), was not sufficiently large to provide the base for any political grotup seeking influence among the Ukrainian population.'0 With its already severe socioeconomic problems further aggravated by the Depression, Wolyni offered ideal conditions for rural revolutionary agitation by Communists and Nationalists. Communist influence was strongest in Wolynf wojewo'dztwo in the 1920s and progressively declined thereafter. Nationalism asserted itself in the middle of the 1930s and remained virtually unchallenged throughout the early 1940s.
Ukrainian Communists were organized within the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (known as the Commuinist Party of Eastern Galicia until 1923). Because the KPZU was illegal, Ukrainian Communists often worked through stuch legal front organizations as the Ukrainian Peasants' and Wor-kers' Socialist Union (Sel'-Rob). Troubled by ideological conflicts usually involving some aspect of the nationality question and its proper implementation in the Ukrainian wojewod2twa of Poland, the KPZU underwent frequent crises culminating in a damaging schism in 1928. On the wane during the 1930s, the KPZU as a component part of the Commiiunist Party of Poland was dissolved in 1938 by the Comintern.
To find the powiaty where the KPZU was relatively strong, the relationship between the size of a pow~iat's total Ukrainian population aild the size of that powiat's combined KPZU-Komsoniol memiibership must be examined (see table 1 ). The pozviaty of relatively greatest Commuinist strength may be determined in this manner, because cadre size alone is obviously inisufficient for comparative purposes. On the reasoning tlhat the smaller the ratio of Ukrainians to Comnmunists, the greater the relative KPZU strength, it is clear that Kowel, Luck, Luboml, and Horochow were the pozwiaty with the relatively largest Ukrainian Communist presence. Ukrainian Nationalists belonged to the OUN, a "supraparty" movement founded in Vienna in 1929. Demanding an independent Ukrainian state and a thoroughgoing social revolution, the OUN based its agrarian program on the preservation of private landholdings and the formation of a strong, landed peasantry. Initially consisting almost entirely of urban-based students, its cadres in time came to include large segments of the rural Ukrainian population as well. Even so, the young remained in the majority throughout the existence of the illegal organization. The OUN was originally confined to the Ukrainian wojewodztwa of eastern Galicia, but in the 1930s it initiated serious efforts to infiltrate Wolyni and, in the process, the organization developed a large indigenous network that was modeled on the Galician pattern.
Attempting to determine relative OUN strength in Wolyli wojewodztwo, however, is a problematic undertaking because no organized statistics such as those for the KPZU exist. The method employed here involved checking lists of Nationalists arrested between 1934 and 1938 (compiled on the basis of newspaper accounts which are necessarily incomplete) and determining the pozwiaty of their origini. This approach is obviously schematic but can suggest the areas of the organization's relative influence. Table 2 provides the numbers of arrested OUN m-iembers and tlhe ratios of Ukraiinians to arrested Nationalists. The ratios clearly suggest that tlhe pozviaty of Luck, Kostopol, Krzemieniec, and Rowne miiay be considered Nationalist strongholds. Significantly, this conclusion is borne out in interviews with former nmembers of thie OUN in Wotyni. According to these participants, however, the Zdolbunow powiat was also strongly influenced How then do these findings relate to the social structure of the Ukrainian countryside? A crucial factor for understanding the importance of land to the social reality of Wotynf wojew6d2two is the Polish government's interwar policy of "colonizing" its so-called "eastern borderlands" (kresy wschodnie) with Polish settlers from the interior of the country. Such colonization was particularly intensive in Wotyni, where there was a large supply of formerly Russian imperial or landowner property that could be distributed or "parceled" out. Throughout the interwar decades colonization and land apportionment went hand in hand as part of the government's land reform. The indigenous Ukrainian peasantry, however, was largely overlooked in this regard, with most of the parceled land going to newly arrived Polish colonists.
The Ukrainian peasant's already severe land hunger was further aggravated by a 47 percent increase in the rural Ukrainian population between 1921 and 1931-from 938,052 to 1,385,867.12 At the same time, the number of urban Ukrainians declined from 45,544 in 1921 to 41,005 in 1931-a 9 percent decrease.13 Extreme overpopulation in rural areas and land hunger combined to make a potent issue for both Communists and Nationalists.
Statistics for landholdings by nationality exist only in the 1931 census. These are grouped into two categories: those owners who "employ hired labor" and those who do not. The latter were independently owned farms and constituted 95-98 percent of all Ukrainian landholdings, depending on the powziat.
12. Compiled on the basis of Le premtier The number of landholders who employed paid agricultural workers may be used as a rough index of the size of the agricultural wage-labor force in a given powiat. (The census provides no statistics on the number of wage laborers employed in agriculture.) The nationality of the owner (something that the census does provide) is unimportant, because he may be assumed to have hired the cheapest labor available, regardless of nationality. Table 3 shows the total number of such landholdings per powiat and their breakdown by size. It is significant that the largest numbers of farms employing hired labor are found in Dubno, Kowel, Luck, and Rowne powiaty. As was already seen in table 1, Kowel and Luck were the strongest Communist powiaty. Dubno had a respectable level of KPZU activity, though hardly equal to that of Kowel or Luck. Only Rowne powiat, apparently one of the KPZU's weak spots, does not meet the expectation that large numbers of landless laborers are found in KPZUinfluenced powiaty.
Independent landholdings, those farms that do not "employ hired labor," can also be classified according to the category of peasant who owned the holding-poor, middle, or rich. Table 4 provides the breakdown according to size and powiat of such Ukrainian-owned farms, and points to a startling conclusion: the powiaty with the largest proportions of poor peasants (Zdolbunow-77 percent, Krzemieniec-77 percent, Kostopol-72 percent, and Rowne-70 percent) experienced the largest OUN and, conversely, the smallest KPZU presence. (The one exception-Sarny with 69 percent-had neither a large OUN nor a large KPZU presence.) Even more significant is that the Kowel powiat, a Communist stronghold, had the smallest proportion (53 percent) of poor peasants. On the other hand, four OUN-dominated powiaty-Kostopol, Krzemieniec, Rowne, and Zdolbunow-were among the lowest in-percentages (either combined or separate) of middle and rich peasants, while the KPZU-dominated powiaty-Horochow, Kowel, Luboml, and Luck-were among those with the largest middle and rich peasant concentrations (either combined or separate). Luck, however, is also an exception to the generalization concerning OUN powiaty (see figure 2, p. 420, for a pictorial representation of these findings). What is to account for the fact that Ukrainian Communists were strongest in areas with the largest numbers of landless laborers and middle and rich peasants, and that Ukrainian Nationalists did best where poor peasants were most numerous? Jeffrey Paige has pointed out that peasants whose relationship to the land they work is based on money are most "prone" to unrest and rebellion. They lack the security of owning a small plot of land and are highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the market because they have the most direct relationship to the market, in the form of wages. Therefore, in times of economic stress (a term that is applicable to Poland during the entire interwar period) the agricultural laborer is the first to experience severe hardships and, having little to lose through a strike or some similar adventure, he is most likely to engage in the sort of revolutionary activity that aims at overthrowing a system based on private property. The Communist claim that private property was the source of the landless laborer's troubles was tailor-made for acquiring that laborer's support.
Middle and rich peasants, however, would not have supported the Ukrainian Communists for the samne reason that the landless laborers rallied to the KPZU. A party that is committed to dispossessing a certain group of people is obviously unlikely to win their support. But in that case, how can one account for the large middle and rich peasant presence in KPZU pozeiaty? Where there are many landless laborers there are likely to be many landholding peasants with more land than they and their families alone can work and who therefore require the assistance of hired labor. As table 3 shows, middle and rich peasants claimed the largest percentage of farms employing wage labor. At the same time, both were in the minority of every powiat's peasant population (see table 4 ). The size of an agricultural wage-labor force was, therefore, very dependent on the available number of middle and rich peasant farms. Consequently, it is not surprising that the powiaty with the largest numbers of agricultural laborers (Dubno, Kowel, Luck) also had very large numbers of middle and rich peasants (except Rowne powi at). 
